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INTRODUCTION
There exists yet another patriotism more rational than [fervent beliefs resting on
an ancient order]: it is less generous, less passionate perhaps but more creative
and lasting; it springs from education, develops with the help of laws, increases
with the exercise of rights and in the end blends in a sense with personal interest.
1

-Alexis de Tocqueville

An educated populace creates an environment for innovation, accelerated economic growth, a more responsible electorate that insti2
tutes wiser policy, and, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted, a wellspring
3
for a more creative and lasting patriotism. Education’s centrality to
4
the success of individuals and society is beyond dispute. The longer
children stay in school, the more likely they are to earn a decent wage
and be independent of the state, reflecting a “growing economic
5
premium on education and skills.” Nor can the undereducated exert
as much influence on the political dialogue in this democratic society,
undermining the uniquely compelling ideal that “government of the
6
people by the people for the people” can flourish.
If education is the wellspring of the most stable patriotism, then
there is one more reason our failed public education system has become a national priority. The failure of public education is more ex7
8
treme for poor and minority children. The 2000 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) for fourth graders found 63%
of African Americans, 58% of Hispanic Americans, and 47% of all

1

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (Gerald E. Bevan trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1835).
2
See, e.g., FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS: AMERICAN INCOMES AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE 4, 190, 191, 197 (1998) (arguing that equalizing institutions, such
as education, are necessary to maintain popular democratic support for pro-growth
economic policies).
3
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 275.
4
See, e.g., Charles S. Benson, Economics of Education: The U.S. Experience, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 355-72 (Norman J. Boyan
ed., 1988) (analyzing the economic benefits of education).
5
LEVY, supra note 2, at 62, 125.
6
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript of the “Nicolay Draft” available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/gatr1.html).
7
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 97-981, THE
SOCIAL CONTEXT OF EDUCATION 1 (July 1997) [hereinafter SOCIAL CONTEXT], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97981.pdf.
8
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2001-061,
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND BLACK-WHITE INEQUALITY 1 (July 2001) [hereinafter
BLACK-WHITE INEQUALITY], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001061.pdf.
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9

children in urban schools reading below a basic level. The largest
and most ambitious federal effort to address the ramifications of inadequate public education is Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
10
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Initially structured without enforce11
ment mechanisms and unsuccessful in achieving educational equity,
Congress has repeatedly revised Title I, introducing a system of standards and accountability that formed the basis of the 2001 version of
12
the Act, entitled No Child Left Behind (NCLB). NCLB included
stricter testing requirements, increased accountability to parents, and
required for the first time that all children reach proficiency in state
13
educational standards.
This Comment examines the rights parents and other aggrieved
parties have or should have under NCLB to hold a state accountable if
its programs do not meet the requirements of the Act. This Comment
14
contends that without private enforcement under section 1983, the
promise of NCLB will go unfulfilled. Although under NCLB the Secretary of Education may enforce state compliance with its obligations
15
under the Act through his power to terminate state funds, Title I, unlike many Spending Clause statutes, does not provide an administrative process or an explicit private cause of action for individuals to

9

NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., NCES 2001-499, THE
NATION’S REPORT CARD: FOURTH GRADE READING 2000, at 30-31, 38 (Apr. 2001)
[hereinafter NATION’S REPORT CARD], available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard
/pdf/main2000/2001499.pdf.
10
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). Title I is a
Spending Clause program, providing funds to local educational agencies in return for
state programs that redress deficits in the education of poor children.
11
See Peter Zamora, Note, In Recognition of the Special Needs of Low-Income Families?:
Ideological Discord and Its Effects upon Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts
of 1965 and 2001, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 413, 424 (2003) (stating that Title
I’s initial requirements for programs were vague and lacked an evaluation component
and an effective enforcement mechanism). For further indications of failure, see infra
note 27.
12
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. I 2001)).
13
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
14
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
15
20 U.S.C. § 6311(g) (Supp. I 2001). Fund termination is a dramatic step that is
rarely taken under any Spending Clause program. Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of
Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 292-93 (1996). In the case of Title I there is concern, however, that the continuing achievement gap is due partially to
a lack of federal enforcement of Title I and the states’ belief that fund termination is
an empty threat. Zamora, supra note 11, at 431-32.
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bring claims and enforce compliance with state or local obligations.
Moreover, federal funding termination is a very limited remedy.
Should intended beneficiaries be able to surmount the absence of an
individual administrative enforcement process, they would have to ask
the Secretary of Education to financially cripple the program they are
trying to improve, an unsatisfactory and unlikely avenue of relief.
Absent express statutory avenues for individual enforcement, an
implied cause of action or an implied right of action under section
1983 become the only possible tools for private enforcement of state
obligations under the Act. In recent opinions, the Supreme Court,
sensitive to separation of powers concerns, has limited the ability of
individuals to bring enforcement actions by an implied cause of action
in the absence of express rights-creating language indicating congres16
sional intent to create remedies. Moreover, in 2002 the Court issued
Gonzaga University v. Doe, in which it cited to its implied cause of action
analysis to determine the existence of a substantive right to be en17
forced under section 1983. This reference has caused some to question whether this remaining avenue for the vindication of federal
18
statutory rights has also been narrowed.
This Comment argues that Gonzaga’s references to implied cause
of action analysis should not be read as conflating the two avenues of
rights enforcement, or as justifying the notion that there are no enforceable rights in NCLB. To use as narrow an approach to imply
rights as to imply remedies would defy clear congressional intent both
in creating section 1983 as a separate cause of action for enforcing
substantive rights and in passing NCLB to solve a problem of national
concern. This Comment contends that a better interpretation of Gonzaga would focus on congressional intent to create rights—-as in implied cause of action cases—-but would look to a wider category of indicia to show intent. While the Court has made clear that it will no
19
longer imply causes of action simply to further statutory purpose, it

16

The Court found in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001), that the
power to create remedies is a legislative one and that judges violate separation of powers principles and infringe on congressional lawmaking authority when they imply private rights of action to enforce statutes. The Court demanded “‘rights-creating’ language” not solely as evidence to create rights, since in this case the right against
disparate impact discrimination was assumed, but as evidence of intent to create a
remedy. Id. at 286.
17
536 U.S. 273, 279-87 (2002).
18
See infra text accompanying notes 73-80 (examining the evolution of this doctrine and questioning its current status).
19
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
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can and should include statutory purpose and scheme as indicators of
20
congressional intent to create rights. A court using this approach
would find that NCLB meets the requirements for rights creation under section 1983, especially because of NCLB’s individually focused
language and inclusion of the contextual factors considered in traditional implied cause of action analysis. Any finding to the contrary is
inconsistent with congressional intent, vitiates NCLB enforcement,
and undermines section 1983 jurisprudence in general.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of Title I, emphasizing the current statute’s dependence on individual action and enforcement. Part II briefly describes the doctrinal development in two
relevant areas: a) the Supreme Court’s reluctance to imply rights and
remedies in statutes that do not expressly provide for them and b) its
uncertain approach to implying substantive rights enforceable under
section 1983, which does expressly provide a remedy for such rights.
Although congressional intent is the touchstone in both inquiries, this
Comment argues that the test for intent is broader and more flexible
in the latter than the former, and that the Court’s most recent precedent, Gonzaga, supports this conclusion. Part III analyzes whether, in
light of the legislative language, purpose and context as well as Supreme Court precedent including Gonzaga, NCLB gives rise to enforceable rights. This question is addressed by examining one potential claim: whether parents can bring a section 1983 action against
State Educational Agency (SEA) officials to enforce state level obliga21
tions under section 6311(b)(8) of NCLB. Part IV suggests that not
only does respect for congressional intent argue for a broad reading
of Gonzaga, federalism concerns do not justify narrowing the scope of
section 1983 enforcement but, on the contrary, support a reading of
Gonzaga that favors finding enforceable rights under the statute.

20

See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1873-75 (2003) (advocating the importation of the analysis from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), into section
1983 jurisprudence to address the concerns expressed in Gonzaga). What I am arguing
is different: the Court should not use statutory purpose as a reason for implying rights
as in the Cort v. Ash analysis, but as an indication of congressional intent for private enforcement. The Court has indicated its willingness to read the third prong of the Cort
v. Ash test in this manner. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988)
(indicating that the four factors in Cort v. Ash are all concerned with congressional intent).
21
20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(8) (Supp. I 2001).
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I. FROM ESEA TO NCLB: CREATION AND
EVOLUTION OF TITLE I
President Johnson first sought to address the failures of the public
education system in 1965 by introducing and pressing for Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Title I established
an annual block grant to state educational agencies (SEAs) in return
for a commitment to provide programs benefiting educationally disadvantaged students. ESEA was aimed at “the effects of the conditions
22
of group poverty upon the individual student.” Title I is still the fed23
eral government’s largest investment in education, as well as the
24
bedrock of its commitment to equality of opportunity.
Title I was passed amid great controversy between those who
thought education should be under local control and those who believed effective education was a national interest that should be ad25
dressed by the national government. As a result, Title I stated a bold
goal but was concerned almost solely with the equity of funding. The
requirements for programs were vague, and ESEA lacked an evalua26
tion component or an effective enforcement mechanism. Scholars
and advocates have offered several reasons for the failure of Title I to
achieve educational parity, but it is agreed that the lack of evaluation
27
and enforcement created significant barriers to Title I’s effectiveness.

22

Zamora, supra note 11, at 419.
See id. at 415 (citing Heritage Statistics).
24
John F. Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in TITLE I:
COMPENSATORY EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1, 6 (Geoffrey D. Borman et al. eds.,
2001).
25
For an analysis of the ideological conflict at the heart of the creation and evolution of ESEA, see Zamora, supra note 11, at 420-35.
26
Id. at 424.
27
Id. at 427-34. The General Accounting Office recently found that most states
were out of compliance with the 1994 accountability and assessment requirements, and
determined that the Department of Education needs to monitor states’ scoring of assessments. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TITLE I: EDUCATION NEEDS TO MONITOR
STATES’ SCORING OF ASSESSMENTS: GAO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 19
(2002) [hereinafter GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE] (“Specifically, [the Department
of] Education should include in its new compliance reviews a check on the controls
states have in place to ensure proper test scoring and the effective implementation of
these controls by states.”), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02393.pdf. The Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights concluded in 1998 that “the
federal government’s failure to take the actions needed to implement and enforce the
[1994 requirements of] Title I has . . . retarded educational progress.” Zamora supra
note 11, at 431-32 (quoting CITIZEN’S COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS TITLE I AT MIDSTREAM: THE FIGHT TO IMPROVE SCHOOLS FOR POOR KIDS 2 (Corrine M. Yu & William
L. Taylor eds., 1998)).
23
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In 2001, both Congress and the President, in a clear statement
that educational parity—not state promises—was the goal of Title I,
28
overhauled NCLB to address the program’s shortcomings. As a result, districts and states have specific obligations under NCLB to the
Department of Education, schools, parents, and students to ensure
29
that the goal of 100% proficiency is met. The new parental notification and choice provisions implement a market-based reform strat30
egy. As explained by John E. Chubb, giving parents a choice among
public schools while removing guaranteed financial support for existing schools will force underachieving institutions to improve in re31
sponse to competitive pressure. That Congress attempted to implement this educational reform by using competition is made clear by
the structure of the Act and its legislative history, as well as from ad32
ministrative statements concerning the Act. The success of the effort
is premised on parental knowledge and action as well as fulfillment of
the SEAs’ commitment to contribute the funding and support required to provide both necessary information and viable choices.

28

The White House described these failings as: (1) its failure to address the
achievement gap between rich and poor students, minority and white students; (2) a
lack of flexibility at state and district levels to address unique concerns; (3) continued
investment in programs that had not ever been proven effective; and (4) a lack of
choice for parents whose children are stuck in failing or dangerous schools. White
House Fact Sheet, No Child Left Behind, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/20020108.html. To implement improvement, NCLB specifies
that each child in each school in grades 3-8 must meet rigorous state standards, defined as 100% proficiency within twelve years. No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §
6311(b)(3)(C) (2002).
29
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8) (Supp. I 2001) (listing requirements for state
educational authorities); id. § 6312(c) (listing requirements for local educational
authorities). NCLB demands many specific steps to assure that states reach the lofty
goal of 100% proficiency. These problems are addressed by increasing accountability
and choice. Id. Each child in these grades must be tested at grade level and the scores
are disaggregated by economic disadvantage, race and ethnicity, disability, and limited
English proficiency. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v). Schools must directly provide parents
with results and make results public. See, e.g., id. § 6311(h). In addition, they must
make adequate yearly progress with each group to avoid a failing label. Id. §
6311(b)(2). Schools that fail for two consecutive years must use Title I funds to allow
students to transfer to a better performing public or charter school. Id. § 6316
(b)(1)(E). Schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress for three years must use
Title I funds to provide “supplemental services” to students, such as tutoring or summer programs. Id. § 6316(b)(5). Schools that continue to fail to make progress face
restructuring and other corrective measures. Id. § 6316(b)(7)-(8).
30
See infra discussion accompanying notes 152-54.
31
See JOHN E. CHUBB, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 206-15 (1990)
(arguing for market-based school reform).
32
See infra text accompanying notes 152-57.

1018

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 1011

II. IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION &
SECTION 1983 ENFORCEMENT
The existence of section 1983, an independent statute that creates
remedies without creating rights, has forced the Court to employ
separate inquiries when looking to imply remedies in private cause of
action cases and substantive rights enforceable under section 1983.
Although Gonzaga made clear that courts should employ a congres33
sional intent-based inquiry in both instances, differences in the concerns underlying each inquiry require a broader and more flexible
approach when determining congressional intent to create rights.
When implying remedies, courts may view the existence of other statutory remedies as creating a presumption against congressional intent
34
to provide further avenues of recourse. To imply remedies in this
situation, in the absence of clear statements to do so, would not only
be overreaching on the part of a court, but may encourage Congress
to avoid these difficult questions of remediation in abdication of their
35
Article I responsibilities. To deal with these separation of powers
concerns, the Supreme Court has instituted a strict clear statement
rule for courts looking for congressional intent to create enforceable
rights.
In suits against state officials acting under color of federal funding
statutes, however, Congress has created an independent remedy. The
Court has found that section 1983 overcomes the negative presump36
tion against private enforceability in implied remedy cases. In this
instance, courts must still look to congressional intent before implying
substantive rights enforceable under section 1983, but that test should
not have to meet the burden that exists in the implied remedy context. Courts can achieve this balance by looking to a wider variety of
indicia of congressional intent when implying substantive rights. Significant frustration of statutory purpose in the absence of private enforceability, the creation of accountability to individuals, and clear
statements requiring universal attainment of statutory goals should be

33

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“Both inquiries . . . require a
determination as to whether Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a
class of beneficiaries.”).
34
Id. at 285-86.
35
See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990) (asserting that the
existence of section 1983 as an express remedy negates the separation of powers concerns that exist in implied remedy cases).
36
Id.
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considered indicators of intent along with the linguistic considerations employed in the implied remedies cases.
A. Implied Private Cause of Action: Implying Private Remedies
Statutes that either explicitly or implicitly create rights and remedies provide authority for individuals to bring private lawsuits for
statutory violations. By providing a statutory cause of action for individuals who have been denied the services or treatment to which they
are entitled, Congress creates “private attorney generals” who have the
37
power to vindicate important national policy goals.
While courts
have always permitted private rights of action where there is explicit
statutory authority for them, it was not until 1964 that the Supreme
38
Court first implied a right of action. Initially, the Court considered
several factors in determining congressional intent to create rights
and remedies, and it was often willing to find implied causes of action.
These factors, solidified in the Cort v. Ash test, were:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted—that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
39
based solely on federal law?

Lower courts used the test to find implied rights of action in several statutes, relying especially on the third prong of the Cort v. Ash
40
test, the furtherance of statutory purpose. In 1979, in Cannon v. Uni41
versity of Chicago, the Court recognized an implied cause of action

37

Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals introduced the
term “private Attorney Generals [sic]” to describe individuals bringing proceedings “to
vindicate the public interest.” Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694, 704 (2d. Cir. 1943).
38
See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a right of action under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
39
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
40
Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 31
(1999).
41
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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under Title IX of the 1972 Education Act Amendments. In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Powell expressed his concern that
judges infringe on congressional lawmaking authority, in violation of
separation of powers principles, by implying private rights of action to
43
enforce a statute. Justice Powell argued that reliance only on Cort’s
second prong---whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action---was the appropriate measure of whether such a right should
44
be implied.
While the Court has never overruled Cort v. Ash, subsequent implied cause of action cases have accepted Justice Powell’s argument.
Not only have they rejected courts’ ability to imply remedies to further
statutory purpose, but they have focused exclusively on congressional
intent to create an individual remedy, and gone even further by looking solely for specific linguistic formulations in statutes as evidence of
45
that intent. The most notable example of this modern analysis is Al46
47
Although assuming a right existed, Justice
exander v. Sandoval.
Scalia, writing for the majority, looked at the language of and subsequent amendments to section 602 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and found no evidence of intent to establish a private cause of ac48
tion. The Court explained that since the text provided no evidence

42

Id. at 680, 688-89 (finding an implied right of action for individuals suing educational institutions under section 901(a) of Title IX of the 1972 Education Act
Amendments); see also Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga
University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2003) (summarizing Cannon).
43
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Absent the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.”).
44
See Key, supra note 15, at 298-99 (explaining Justice Powell’s view that only Congress should have the right to determine whether lower federal courts have jurisdiction
over particular causes of action).
45
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 178-80
(1994) (focusing on congressional intent in the absence of an express provision);
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992) (stating that the Cort test puts the burden of proof on plaintiffs to show congressional intent to establish a private remedy);
Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (asserting that courts should focus on evidence of congressional intent in determining
whether to imply a private cause of action); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179
(1988) (indicating that the four factors in Cort v. Ash are all concerned with congressional intent); Key, supra note 15 at 285, 297 (discussing these cases).
46
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
47
Id. at 286 (“[W]e assume . . . that [the statute] confers authority to promulgate
disparate-impact regulations . . . .”).
48
See id. at 289-93 (holding, in a five-to-four decision, that while there is an implied cause of action under section 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there is
no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under
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49

of intent, “[w]e therefore hold that no such right exists.” Due to the
emphasis on clear textual evidence of intent, courts have been ex50
ceedingly hesitant to imply rights of action under the new analysis.
As a result, plaintiffs have turned to section 1983 to vindicate rights in
51
statutes that do not contain explicit remedies.
B. Section 1983 as a Remedy for Federal Statutory Violations: Implying
Substantive Rights
Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights “secured by the Constitution
52
and laws” against infringement by the states. When these rights are
violated, section 1983 provides an action to claim damages or injunc53
tive relief against those responsible for the violations. A federal statute is presumed enforceable unless Congress did not intend to create
a right, a presumption that is defeated if private enforceability is pre54
cluded by a comprehensive enforcement scheme. While the second
prong of this inquiry remains unchanged, a debate has emerged over
how willing a court should be to find congressional intent to create
individual rights, and by what methods courts should find such an in55
tent.

section 602).
49
Id. at 293.
50
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (observing that the Court rejected claims of implied right of action in nine
of eleven recent cases); see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies:
An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 91 (2001) (noting that a requirement of
clear evidence of congressional intent ensures that few private actions will be found).
51
Mank, supra note 40, at 1427.
52
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
53
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE
LAW OF SECTION 1983, at 1-3 (4th ed. 2000).
54
See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (noting the two instances in which section 1983 does not provide a cause of action in response to a violation of a federal statute); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1981) (finding for the first time that the presumption in favor
of enforceability is rebutted by a comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme).
55
In his treatise on section 1983 litigation, Martin Schwartz noted that many decisions in this area have been five-to-four votes along essentially liberal-conservative lines
and that the vacillating approach to this jurisprudence may reflect the changing composition of the Court since Maine v. Thiboutot was decided in 1980, in that “a vote for
enforceability is a vote in furtherance of individual rights and a vote against enforceability is a vote in favor of federalism and states’ rights.” MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 4.01 (2004).
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56

In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court ruled broadly that section 1983 encompasses all statutory violations of federal law, and has
been interpreted by the Court to create a presumption in favor of en57
forceability of substantive rights. This decision came in the wake of
dramatic cutbacks in the Court’s willingness to find implied remedies
in federal statutes due to separation of powers concerns. Many saw
Thiboutot as the Court’s way of allowing individuals to vindicate federal
rights previously enforced by private rights of action with a tool that
58
did not raise the same constitutional concerns.
Although Thiboutot did not proscribe a standard for implying substantive rights under section 1983, the Court began that endeavor the
next year. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, thenJustice Rehnquist wrote for the six-to-three majority that “if Congress
intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must
59
do so unambiguously.” The Court distinguished between statutes
that speak in “precatory terms,” meant only to convey preferences for
certain kinds of treatment and assist the states to improve services,
versus those statutes that explicitly impose “obligations” on a state to
60
fund certain rights. Under the test that emerged, the Court would
56

448 U.S. 1 (1980).
See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (referring to the presumption in favor of enforceability of substantive rights under section 1983 and distinguishing the inquiry from
that involved in implied rights of action cases). Justice Brennan’s six-to-three decision
in Thiboutot was accompanied by an adamant dissent written by Justice Powell and
joined by then-Justice Rehnquist. The dissent argued that the Court’s decision would
unreasonably and “dramatically expand the liability of state and local officials” by subjecting them to liability for all sorts of federal statutory violations. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at
12 (Powell, J., dissenting). Additionally, Powell contended that the interpretation of
“and laws” in section 1983 should be limited to civil rights statutes. Id. at 22.
58
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1846.
59
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
60
Id. at 18-19. While the majority found intent only to encourage state policy
rather than to create rights, the three dissenting Justices (White, Brennan, and Marshall), reading the same statutory language and legislative history, did find congressional intent to create enforceable rights under section 1983. Id. at 53 (White, J., dissenting). The views reflected in the Pennhurst dissent had held the majority in the two
previous cases before the Court. In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), in a five-to-four vote, the Court reinforced its unwillingness to preclude section 1983 actions under Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), especially since there was no other avenue
of private judicial remedy. Wright, 479 U.S. at 427. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,
496 U.S. 498 (1990), the Court applied the approach set out in earlier cases and in a
five-to-four vote found enforceable rights in the statute at hand. The dissent, written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist (who was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) disagreed and argued that, at most, the plaintiffs had procedural rights to have
the state follow the procedure set out in the provision, but not to hold the state ac57
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only imply rights when the text and structure of the act at issue clearly
imposed mandatory funding obligations.
Eleven years later in Suter v. Artist M., the Court narrowed this test,
confusing the standard for implying substantive rights and the standard for implying enforceable rights at work in implied remedies
61
cases. The Court in Pennhurst had called for signs of an unambiguous intent for a statute to create a binding obligation on the state.
The Court in Suter rephrased the inquiry, stating that it was looking
for language to “unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of
62
This new phrasing is
the Act a right to enforce the requirement.”
analogous to the more rigorous standard required in the implied
remedies cases where plaintiffs have the burden of showing congressional intent to create a right and a remedy. The dissent argued that
this new standard violated the presumption in favor of private en63
forceability once the substantive right is determined.
64
The change in approach in Suter elicited concern from Congress,
65
and led to confusion in lower courts. When the Court decided its
66
next two important section 1983 cases, Livadas v. Bradshaw and Bless67
68
ing v. Freestone, it did not employ the Suter reasoning. In Livadas,
the Court affirmed its presumption in favor of enforceability of sub69
stantive rights under section 1983. In Blessing, the Court refined the
test for determining congressional intent to create rights:
countable to adequate results. Id. at 527-28.
61
The majority found that the term “‘reasonable efforts’ does not unambiguously
confer an enforceable right upon [its] beneficiaries.” Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,
363 (1992). This was the first decision to find no enforceable rights under section
1983 after lenient interpretations in Wright and Wilder. Many commentators note that
the approach in Suter in fact reflects the triumph of Rehnquist’s reasoning in his Wilder
dissent, and that it was made possible by the ascension of Justice Souter and Justice
Thomas to the Court. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, § 4.03.
62
503 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).
63
In the dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun accused the majority of failing to
apply the test as applied in Wilder, id. at 371, and of inverting the established presumption that a private remedy is available under section 1983 unless Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy in the statutory provision itself, either through vague language or a comprehensive enforcement scheme. Id. at 377.
64
See infra text accompanying note 222 (describing Congress’s amendment to the
Social Security Act to repudiate the reasoning of the decision).
65
See infra note 223 (detailing lower courts’ approaches to the Suter decision).
66
512 U.S. 107 (1994).
67
520 U.S. 329 (1997).
68
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1851 (“So as the Court took up Blessing
v. Freestone, it faced a virtual repudiation of Suter’s principles from both lower courts
and Congress, and chose not to defend them with another divisive opinion.”).
69
Livadas, 512 U.S. at 133 (stating that, apart from “exceptional cases” where
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We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether
a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the
plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly
protected by the statute is not so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must
70
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.
71

Suter became part of the third prong of this test. The Blessing decision equated this requirement with the Pennhurst standard of “manda72
tory rather than precatory terms.” The Court seemed to recognize
that the implication of substantive rights for which a remedy already
exists requires a different and more relaxed standard. To employ the
same standard would vitiate congressional intent in creating section
1983 and reaffirmed the difference in the wake of the Suter decision.
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court, purporting to clarify its section 1983 jurisprudence, introduced new elements into its analysis
73
without specifying their relationship to the Blessing test. Falling short
of Suter’s demand for an unambiguous right to enforce, the majority
74
called for the statute to provide an “unambiguously conferred right,”
which would be determined based on an inquiry “no different from
75
the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case.” The inquiry is
“whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a
76
class of beneficiaries.” It is not enough that petitioners are in the
77
“zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect,” courts
should look for “rights-creating language” with “individually focused
terminology,” such as that found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
78
1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Rather
Congress either did not create an enforceable right or created a complete remedial
scheme, “§ 1983 remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed
violations of federal law”).
70
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
71
Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1851.
72
Id. at 1852. The Court refers to the requirement that provisions create obligations rather than state congressional policy preferences.
73
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). The Court did find that the
provision of FERPA at issue in the case would not have met the Blessing standard because its nondisclosure provisions have an aggregate rather than an individual focus.
Id. at 288.
74
Id. at 282.
75
Id. at 285.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 283.
78
Id. at 287. These are the classic examples of statutes that provide for private
rights of action. They both include the phrase “no person . . . shall . . . be subjected
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than reserving consideration of the statutory enforcement mechanism
until after the determination of rights creation, the majority considered the enforcement mechanism as part of its initial inquiry. The
Court found that an enforcement scheme that provided a centralized
administrative avenue to hear individual complaints was not sufficient
79
to satisfy the Sea Clammers test, but buttressed their understanding
80
that the statutory language did not confer individual rights.
Gonzaga clearly directs courts to adopt the implied right of action
approach with its focus on congressional intent. What is unclear is
whether the Court meant to adopt the singular focus on language exemplified by Sandoval, where the right was assumed and the Court
only sought to determine intent for private enforceability, or to allow
more varied indicators of intent in recognition of section 1983 as a
congressionally created remedy. In his Gonzaga dissent, Justice Stevens feared a shift to the former and explained why this restrictive implied right of action standard is unnecessary:
[O]ur implied right of action cases “reflec[t] a concern, grounded in
separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the
availability of remedies for violations of statutes.” However, imposing
the implied right of action framework upon the § 1983 inquiry . . . is not
necessary: The separation-of-powers concerns present in the implied
right of action context “are not present in a § 1983 case,” because Con81
gress expressly authorized private suits in § 1983 itself.

Justice Stevens argued that the Sandoval standard contradicted the
majority’s assertion that a section 1983 plaintiff should not shoulder
82
the burden of demonstrating congressional intent for enforceability.
Implied remedies cases, he asserted, focus on individual “rightscreating language” because the Court needed a level of certainty re83
quired to find an implied remedy in the statute. Since the Court
does not have to make that same determination in section 1983 cases,

to.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). FERPA, the statute at issue
in Gonzaga, commanded that “no funds shall be made available” to institutions that
have prohibited policies, a mandate two steps removed from the individual interests
that Doe was trying to vindicate in court. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287.
79
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90.
80
Id. at 290 n.8.
81
Id. at 300 (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990))
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
82
See id. at 301 (citing the majority investigation of whether “Congress . . . intended private suits to be brought”).
83
Id.
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the test for determining rights creation should not be based on the
84
same criteria.
While statutory language is an important consideration in Gonzaga, unlike the Court’s analysis in Sandoval, it is not the only factor
examined. The reasoning in Gonzaga is akin to the older approach
85
found in the Cort v. Ash test. The Cort v. Ash approach directs attention to the statutory purpose and context, as did the Court in Gonzaga.
While requiring that the Act “especially benefit,” rather than just
86
“benefit,” the plaintiff, it does not require the same singular focus on
language that the Court has demanded in recent implied cause of ac87
tion cases. While applying the new cause of action analysis to section
1983 cases would be devastating to individuals seeking private enforcement, an inquiry that includes legislative purpose and context as
indicators of congressional intent to create rights would limit, but not
end, section 1983 enforcement actions.
Since the Gonzaga majority does not claim to overrule any former
precedent, it does not explain whether it intends for courts to follow
the Sandoval implied right of action approach and look solely for individually focused rights-creating language, to merely indicate that
88
lower courts should be more sparing in finding rights, or to retain
the Blessing approach to imply substantive rights and the Thiboutot presumption of enforceability, but with greater focus on indications of
89
congressional intent to create substantive rights. This Comment applies, and then argues for, the latter reading of Gonzaga, but with inclusion of a broader spectrum of indicia of intent than allowed under

84

Id. at 301-303.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-44 (describing the Cort v. Ash test). While
the second prong refers to intent to create a remedy, it can easily be relevant to section
1983 by replacing “remedy” with “right.” While courts are no longer willing to imply a
remedy to further the purpose of an act, as suggested by the third prong, courts should
be willing to examine statutory purpose and context in the determination of congressional intent to create individual rights. It is arguably harder to make the fourth prong
relevant to rights creation without infringing on congressional legislative power.
86
“Benefit” is the standard under the first prong of the Blessing test. See Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (“Congress must have intended that the provision
in question benefit the plaintiff.”).
87
See Mank, supra note 42, at 1426, 1469-82 (discussing the Court’s willingness to
look at legislative history in determining intent in implied right of action cases and advocating for the continued use of legislative history in section 1983 analysis).
88
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281; see also Samberg-Champion supra note 20, at 1856
(noting questions raised by the reasoning in Gonzaga).
89
Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1885-86 (advocating that courts adopt a
similar interpretation of the decision).
85
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90

Sandoval.
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not offered
clarification about what interpretation it intended.
III. AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT IN NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
To frame the argument that NCLB contains enforceable rights
even under the Gonzaga standard, this Comment focuses only upon
one potential section 1983 claim: whether parents or other aggrieved
parties can, in order to enforce state level obligations under 20 U.S.C.
§ 6311(b)(8), bring an action against SEA officials under Ex parte
91
92
Young for prospective injunctive relief.
While there are other
NCLB provisions that likely create enforceable rights, the purpose
93
here is to demonstrate the efficacy of one, not all, possible claims.

90

In a recent decision, the Third Circuit followed this latter interpretation of Gonzaga in order to find a private right of action in three provisions of the Medicaid Act.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189-93 (3d Cir. 2004). To determine whether the
statute created rights, the Court applied the Blessing test to determine whether the
plaintiffs fell in the zone of interest that the statute was meant to protect and then
looked to make sure that the language was individually focused in a way necessary to
create rights. Id. at 189-90. In a second inquiry the Court examined the rest of the
statute to make sure that rights created under the specific provisions furthered the
purpose of the Act as a whole. Id. at 190-93.
91
209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890), the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from suing their state government. In Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, however, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment does not act as a bar to federal suits naming a state official as a defendant if the
relief sought is prospective injunctive relief even if the judgment would have a negative
impact on the state treasury. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-72 (1974), allows official capacity actions against individual state agents for prospective injunctive relief.
The Court specifically found in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 n.10 (1989), that a state official can be a defendant “person” within the meaning of
section 1983 even when sued for injunctive relief in her official capacity, to the extent
the relief sought is prospective.
92
The Court has characterized spending of state funds on compensatory educational programs as prospective relief because the funds were “a necessary consequence
of compliance in the future” with the plan at issue. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
289 (1977) (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668).
93
The one section 1983 case that has been brought under NCLB was dismissed.
See Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. N.Y. City Dep’t. of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d
338, 344-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that Congress did not intend to create individually enforceable rights with respect to the notice, transfer, or supplemental educational
services (SES) provisions contained in NCLB). The claim in this case was brought
against school districts based on the provisions of the NCLB regarding transfer, SES,
and parental notification provisions triggered when a school has been identified for
improvement or restructuring for failing to meet the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
benchmarks for improvement. Id. at 340-43. The provisions of NCLB addressed in
this case present different issues from the ones addressed in this Comment, including
the appropriateness of a suit against the school districts and the binding nature of the
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Even with the more stringent considerations added to the Blessing
analysis by Gonzaga, the text, purpose, structure, and history of NCLB
demonstrate that Congress intended to create an individualized right
for parents to enforce state level commitments under 20 U.S.C.
6311(b)(8) to provide an equal and effective education to each and
every child.
A. Intended Beneficiaries?
Under the first prong of the Blessing test, Congress must intend
94
that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. In Gonzaga, the
Court stipulated that it is “rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’
or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under the authority of that sec95
tion.” The purpose of NCLB is to create an individual right to an
equal opportunity for an effective education. Section 6301 provides,
“the purpose of this subchapter . . . is to ensure that all children have
a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State
96
academic achievement standards and State academic assessments.”
This language makes clear that the statute creates a right to the same
extent required by implied cause of action cases and not a benefit to a
group of people within the “zone of interest that the statute is in97
tended to protect.”
The statute is both “phrased in terms of the persons benefited,”
98
and has “an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” The phrasing
mirrors the statutes held up by the Court as examples of rights creating language. Title VI and Title IX seek to ensure that “[n]o per99
son . . . [shall] be subjected to discrimination.” In the same vein,

choice and SES provisions against districts. For that reason, detailed analysis of that
court’s treatment of those provisions is beyond the purview of this Comment. The decision, however, was problematic because it did not consider the context of the provision within the Act. It failed to analyze the purpose of the statute when looking for
rights-creating language or the centrality of parental action to the market-based improvement mechanism at work in the Act. In addition, the court did not address the
completeness of the centralized enforcement mechanism. For a more detailed critique, see Melanie Natasha Henry, Comment, No Child Left Behind?: Educational Malpractice Litigation for the 21st Century, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1158-66 (2004).
94
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
95
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
96
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
97
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
98
Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
99
Id. at 287 (citation omitted).
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NCLB seeks to ensure that “all children have a fair, equal, and signifi100
101
The focus is not “two steps removed,” as in
cant opportunity.”
102
FERPA, which focused on the Secretary of Education’s distribution
of funds. Like the civil rights statutes mentioned above, NCLB is an
affirmative grant of rights to children, not a prohibition against fund
disbursement to institutions engaged in disfavored practices.
While some might argue that the term “all children,” unlike “per103
son,” has an “‘aggregate’ focus” of the type ruled out in Gonzaga,
several factors demonstrate that this language was intended to create
an individual right to an opportunity for an effective education for
each and every child in America’s public schools. In Gonzaga, the
Court contrasted FERPA’s aggregate language, prohibiting the funding of “any educational agency or institution which has a policy or
104
practice of permitting the release of education records,” with language in Title VI and IX stating that “[n]o person . . . [shall] be sub105
jected to discrimination.” FERPA refers to a “policy or practice,” not
106
an intended class of beneficiaries. Language that refers to a class of
individuals, however, is not considered aggregate language according
107
to standards mentioned elsewhere in the case.
Even if the reference to a class was cause for concern, there is evidence of congressional intent for the language to create an individual
right. Congress changed the title of the Act from 1994’s “Improving
108
America’s Schools Act,” focusing on schools, to “No Child Left Be109
110
This shift mirrors a
hind,” which focuses on individual children.
100

20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287.
102
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
The relevant portion of the FERPA provides, “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy
or practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of students without the
written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization.” Id. §
1232g(b)(1).
103
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
104
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)-(2)).
105
Id. at 287.
106
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).
107
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-84 (approving rights-creating language that confers
benefits on an intended class).
108
Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518
(1994) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (2000 & Supp. I 2001)).
109
Emphasis added.
110
The Court has not been willing to presume that a statute creates enforceable
rights because it “speaks in terms of rights.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289 n.7 (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1981), and rejecting
101
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change in the Act’s structure to require, in addition to greater accountability to individual parents, that 100% of children reach profi111
ciency on state achievement tests by 2014. That Congress conceived
of NCLB in the mold of historic civil rights laws is reflected in the title
of a press release by Representative John Boehner, Chairman of the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce, upon submitting
the bill: “H.R.1 Reflects President Bush’s Plan to Make Literacy ‘the
112
In light of this understanding of the Act’s purNew Civil Right.’”
pose, “all children” must be understood to mean “each and every
child.”
This textual interpretation is bolstered by both the statute’s legislative history and litigation brought under the Act. The introduction
to the 1994 Act, in which the fundamental accountability procedures
were first implemented, begins with the following policy statement:
The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that a
high-quality education for all individuals and a fair and equal opportunity to obtain that education are a societal good, are a moral imperative,
and improve the life of every individual, because the quality of our indi113
vidual lives ultimately depends on the quality of the lives of others.

Other legislative history echoes the individual focus and suggests that
Congress intended individuals to have a privately enforceable right
under NCLB. Since the initial passage of Title I in 1965, more than
thirty lawsuits have been brought by parents or other private parties to
enforce provisions of Title I. Federal courts have decided these cases
on the merits, seeming to assume, without directly addressing, an im114
plied right of action or enforceable rights under section 1983.
While these cases were brought mostly in the 1970s before the doctrinal restrictions on finding enforceable rights laid out in Pennhurst,
Suter, and Gonzaga, a Senate report accompanying the 1994 Act also
evinces the intent to create a privately enforceable right, stating that

Justice Stevens’ attempt to use the reference to “rights” in the title of FERPA to reach a
conclusion of enforceability under § 1983). The title is used here to refine the meaning of the language, not to make a presumption of enforceability based on the use of a
word.
111
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (Supp. I 2001).
112
Press Release, U.S. Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), Chairman, Committee on
Education and the Workforce, Disappointing Scores Highlight Urgent Need for President’s Reading First Initiative (Apr. 6, 2001), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov
/press/press107/readfirst4601.htm.
113
Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 1001(a)(1).
114
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Pittenger, 364 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (finding
for parents who brought an action to enforce provisions of Title I).

2005]

OPEN-MINDED SECTION 1983 JURISPRUDENCE

1031

“the new ‘procedures and remedies’ were ‘designed to supplement
and not replace other existing procedures and remedies’ in the stat115
ute.” This language, which post-dates the cases, demonstrates Con116
gress’s intent to preserve the rights accepted in these decisions.
B. Too Vague to be Enforced?
The second prong of the Blessing test asks whether the plaintiff’s
asserted interests are not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the
117
competence of the judiciary to enforce. While NCLB’s reference to
“fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality edu118
cation” is in itself ambiguous, the Act requires the participating
states to define these terms and section 6311(b)(8) specifically re119
quires states to detail the actions they will take to meet them. Under
this provision states must articulate how the state will assist the local
educational authority (LEA) in providing educational assistance to
individual students assessed as needing help to meet state standards
and how the SEA will “ensure that poor and minority children are not
taught at higher rates than other children by inexperienced, unquali120
It is these more specific provisions
fied, or out-of-field teachers.”
that parents and children would bring section 1983 actions to enforce.
The Civil Rights statutes that the Court held up as models for
rights creation follow this same procedure for establishing and enforc121
“Discrimination” is a vague and general term that has
ing rights.
been defined by laws, administrative regulations, and case law. In the
same way, “fair, equal and significant opportunity” is no more of a
115

See William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal
Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751, 1767 n.77 (2003) (quoting S. REP. NO.
103-292, at 9 (1994)).
116
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court found a private right of action in Title IX because the statute was modeled on Title VI, which was
being enforced by private suits. While the Court did not say whether these suits were
proper under Title VI, the fact that Congress passed the statute with the same language, knowing that courts allowed private suits, was evidence of intent to create a private right of action. Id. at 694-703. Similarly, Congress included this language in the
Senate report, evincing awareness and support of private enforceability. Courts should
be as willing as the Cannon Court to see this inclusion as evidence of intent.
117
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
118
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
119
Id. § 6311(b)(8).
120
Id. § 6311(b)(8)(C).
121
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) as examples of legislation containing explicit rights-creating language).
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vague term that has been and will be defined in the same way. The
exact nature of an institution’s obligation to prevent discrimination is
122
also not clear in the language quoted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. It
is only clear that the nature of the state’s obligation is absolute, just as
in the language in NCLB. The provisions in § 6311(b)(8) force the
state to define specific and unambiguous steps to make sure children
123
receive the educational opportunities promised.
In Blessing, the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for finding that
“Title IV-D creates enforceable rights in families in need of Title IV-D
services” without ever specifying “exactly which ‘rights’ it was purport124
ing to recognize.” Instead, the Ninth Circuit found “that federal law
gave respondents the right to have the State substantially comply with
125
Title IV-D in all respects.”
Finding a right created in the purpose
statement of the NCLB might seem to apply this “blanket approach”
126
that was negated in Blessing, but none of the faults the Court found
in the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the statute at issue in that case are
present in NCLB.
When a claim is brought against an SEA official under § 6311(b)(8),
it will be brought for specific failures of the state to comply with its
127
commitments under one of these five sections.
Parties would not
bring a general complaint that the state had substantially failed to enforce NCLB. Instead of claiming “undefined rights,” a claimant would
128
Their claims
break the action into “manageable analytic bites.”

122

See id. (“‘No person in the United States shall . . . be subjected to discrimination’
on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex” (omission and emphasis in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
123
In Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-86 (2001), the Court held that the
rights created against discrimination in § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 2000d (1994), did not extend to those regulations authorized under § 602 that went
beyond the scope of § 601. Id. at 285-86. In NCLB, none of the provisions in 20 U.S.C.
§ 6311(b)(8) go beyond the scope of the right created in § 6301. The text of § 6301
creates a right that the provisions under § 6311(b)(8) clearly serve to effectuate.
124
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997).
125
Id.
126
See id. at 343-44 (declining to find a general right to substantial compliance
with the Social Security Act).
127
Examples would be a failure to “provide additional educational assistance to
individual students assessed as needing help to achieve the state’s challenging academic achievement standards,” 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8)(B) (Supp. I 2001), or a failure
to implement “the specific steps the State educational agency will take to ensure that
both schoolwide programs and targeted assistance schools provide instruction by
highly qualified instructional staff.” Id. § 6311(b)(8)(C).
128
See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342 (“Only when the complaint is broken down into
manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies
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would enumerate specific failures to take steps the state has defined as
essential to providing “a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on
challenging State academic achievement standards and state academic
129
assessments.”
C. A Binding Obligation?
The Blessing test’s third prong asks whether the statute imposes a
binding obligation on the state: Is the language couched in “manda130
tory rather than precatory terms?” In enunciating this requirement,
the Blessing Court cites the discussion in Pennhurst of congressionally
created obligations that meet the mandatory requirement and give
131
rise to an implied cause of action.

the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates
rights.”).
129
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001). These particular types of claims have been
considered in a number of Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512
U.S. 107 (1994) (holding that an employee had a private right under the National Labor Relations Act to sue the State Labor Commissioner based on the Commissioner’s
policy of refusing to enforce her right to prompt payment upon discharge); Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (holding that the provision of the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 providing that a state will be reimbursed by the federal
government for certain expenses incurred in administering foster care and adoption
services does not confer on its beneficiaries a private right enforceable in a section
1983 action); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (granting hospital management a cause of action under section 1983 to challenge the state’s compliance with
the Medicaid Act provision that obliges states to adopt reasonable and adequate hospital reimbursement rates); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418 (1987) (holding that tenants living in low-income housing projects owned by the
City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority had a cause of action under
section 1983 to enforce the Brooke Amendment to the United States Housing Act of
1937, which created a rent ceiling for public housing units). While the Court in Blessing analyzed provisions that on their own do not create rights in the FERPA statute, the
provisions were never attached to any broader right. Although it is unlikely that “Congress meant to give each and every Arizonan who is eligible for Title IV-D the right to
have the State Department of Economic Security staffed at a ‘sufficient’ level,” Blessing,
520 U.S. at 345, it is clear that Congress intended that each child in a school funded
under Title I of NCLB be taught by a highly qualified teacher. In fact, achieving this
goal was one of the primary purposes of the Act, which sets a firm deadline for reaching this result. See 20 U.S.C. § 6601 (goal of having highly qualified teachers); id. §
6677 (deadline). Furthermore, the definition of highly-qualified is reached through a
combination of state and federal regulations and it would not be any strain to judicial
competence to determine, unlike the requirements apparent in Suter and Livadas.
130
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.
131
Id. (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510-11; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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Unlike legislation enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and know132
ingly accepted the terms of the “contract.”
133

The Pennhurst Court found that the statute in question merely expressed a congressional preference for the systematic improvement of
care for mentally disabled individuals by encouraging better planning,
134
coordination, and demonstration projects. For evidence, the Court
cited the failure of the statute to condition funding on the state’s
agreement to meet provisions, as well as Congress’s dramatic under135
funding of the program. The Court found it inconceivable that participating states were aware of the binding force of the statutory obligations when there was no conditional language and even those
administering the statute did not understand it to impose binding ob136
ligations.
The terms of section 6311(b)(8) are mandatory components of
the plan the state must submit to receive funding. The section is titled
“Requirement” and it details the ongoing responsibilities of the SEA
137
to individual districts, schools, and students.
Unlike the statute in
Pennhurst, NCLB is clear that funding rests on state compliance with
these responsibilities: “If a State fails to meet any of the requirements
of this section, other than the requirements described in paragraph

132

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
89 Stat. 496 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (2000)).
134
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 22.
135
See id. at 23-24 (finding that the implementing regulations stated that the purpose of the Act was to improve and coordinate the provision of services to persons with
developmental disabilities and did not empower the Secretary to cut off funds for a
failure to deliver the rights claimed under the provisions at issue in the case).
136
The Pennhurst Court explained its rationale by asserting:
In this case, Congress fell well short of providing clear notice to the States that
they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply
with § 6010. Not only does § 6010 lack conditional language, but it strains
credulity to argue that participating States should have known of their “obligations” under § 6010 when the Secretary of HHS, the governmental agency responsible for the administration of the Act and the agency with which the participating states have the most contact, has never understood § 6010 to impose
conditions on participating States.
Id. at 25.
137
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8) (Supp. I 2001). These provisions will be even more
concrete once the state writes and submits its plan to the Secretary.
133
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(1), then the Secretary may withhold funds for State administration
under this part until the Secretary determines that the State has ful138
filled those requirements.”
Further evidence of Congressional intent for section 6311(b)(8)
to create binding obligations lies in the evolution of that section from
the 1994 legislation to the 2001 Act. The 1994 version of Title I was
the first to include a version of section 6311(b)(8), making states accountable for providing economically disadvantaged schools and districts with the educational resources necessary to meet the perform139
ance standards also created in that act.
In 2001 Congress added
four other provisions to this section, making state obligations even
140
more clear. While there are still abstract terms, section 6311(b) requires regulations that make the provisions more specific and delineate the steps that states will take to achieve NCLB’s goals. Thus,
141
NCLB can be distinguished from the statutes discussed in Pennhurst,
142
143
Suter, and Blessing, each of which was found to be too vague to create rights. Given these specific implementing regulations, courts will
not find it beyond their ability to hold states accountable to these
steps.
The states were certainly aware of the magnitude of their commitment under NCLB, and expected to be bound by it. Most states
144
have made changes to comply with the Act. Some have considered
138

Id. § 6311(g)(2).
Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 1111(b)(8)(A),
108 Stat. 3518, 3527 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(8)(A)
(Supp. I 2001)). For a description of the evolution of the State accountability provisions, see Taylor, supra note 115, at 1764-66.
140
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8)(B)–(E) (Supp. I 2001).
141
See supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing the Pennhurst Court’s distinction between statutes that speak in precatory terms and those that impose specific
obligations).
142
See supra text accompanying notes 61-62 (discussing the Suter Court’s holding
that the term “‘reasonable efforts’ did not unambiguously confer an enforceable right
upon [its] beneficiaries”).
143
See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 (noting that the Blessing Court concurred with the distinction between mandatory and precatory terms discussed in Pennhurst).
144
See States’ Grades on Education Mixed, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at A07 (“Most
states have met or are on the way to meeting 75 percent of the major requirements of
the No Child Left Behind law, according to the nonpartisan Education Commission of
the States. That level of compliance has more than doubled over the past year.”);
Education Commission of the States, Recent State Activities/Policies: No Child Left Behind,
at http://www.ecs.org/html/offsite.asp?document=%2fecs%2fecscat.nsf%2fWebTopic
View%3fOpenView%26RestrictToCategory%3dNo%2bChild%2bLeft%2bBehind (last
visited Dec. 31, 2004) (detailing recent legislation enacted or proposed by various
139
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refusing Title I funding in order to avoid NCLB obligations, further
indicating that the extent and binding nature of NCLB’s require145
ments are clear.
D. Context?
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Pennhurst that “[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law,
146
In Gonzaga, the Court followed this
and to its object and policy.”
approach and looked to the context of the provision in question—its
relationship to other clauses and the enforcement mechanisms pro147
The
vided—in determining whether a private right was created.
Gonzaga Court found that the individual rights asserted by the plaintiff, when viewed in the context of the section of FERPA at issue, referred only to the type of “policy or practice” that triggers a funding
148
prohibition.
This conclusion, stated the Gonzaga majority, is but149
The Secretary
tressed by the centralized enforcement mechanism.
was designated to deal with violations by establishing a compliance office that would review individual complaints and a provision was
added to centralize enforcement in order to standardize interpreta150
The Court then drew a
tion of and responsibilities under the Act.

states to comply with NCLB) (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
145
Sam Dillon, Some School Districts Challenge Bush’s Signature Education Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at A1:
[T]hree Connecticut school districts have rejected federal money rather than
comply with the red tape that accompanies the law, and several Vermont districts have shifted federal poverty money away from schools to shield them
from sanctions . . . . A Republican legislator has introduced a bill that would
prohibit Utah authorities from complying with the law or accepting the $100
million it would bring the state. Half a dozen other state legislatures have
voted to study similar action.
See also William Tucker, No Critics Left Behind, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 7, 2004, at 11 (“Cheshire,
Conn. recently turned down $80,000 in federal school funding tied to NCLB, arguing
that the bureaucracy and paperwork involved in dividing students into racial and ethnic groupings and testing their abilities wasn’t worth it.”).
146
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (quoting
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)).
147
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285-86 (“[W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual
rights, there is no basis for a private suit . . . under § 1983 . . . .”).
148
Id. at 288-89.
149
Id. at 289-90.
150
See id. at 290 (noting that Congress added a provision centralizing all enforcement proceedings except for hearings).
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comparison to Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, where they found that congressional intent to decentralize
151
enforcement supported a right of action.
NCLB’s focus on school accountability to parents demonstrates
congressional intent that parental action be a central part of the enforcement scheme. The Act repeatedly calls for parents to be informed of the status of the school, their child’s teacher, and their op152
tions for choice.
These notification provisions are designed to
stimulate a market-reform model where informed parents become
consumers able to force the improvement of not only their own
child’s school, but of the system as a whole, as schools compete for
153
their children. That Congress intended for parents to be the agents
of reform is highlighted by congressional statements about the design
of the Act. The same week NCLB was introduced into the House of
Representatives, Representative John Boehner made the following
statement:
We can give parents the ability to transfer their children out of failing
schools—and we must, through private school choice and other
means—but even that power is greatly diminished if parents don’t know
which schools are failing and which are succeeding. Testing produces
data—and in the hands of concerned, involved parents, data equals
154
power.

It is clear from this statement that Congress intended to empower
parents to take action, not just to be informed, and that these individual actions would lead to systemic improvements.
151

479 U.S. 418, 426 (1987) (“Congress’ aim was to provide a decentralized . . .
administrative process.”).
152
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1) (Supp. I 2001) (requiring that the annual state
report card be presented in an understandable and uniform format and, to the extent
practicable, provided in a language that the parents can understand); id. §
6311(h)(2)(E) (requiring the same for annual local educational agency report cards);
id. § 6311(h)(6) (highlighting, in the “Parents right-to-know” section, the LEA’s duty
to the parents of each student to inform them of the status of their child’s teacher and
their child’s performance on the state academic assessment); see also Henry, supra note
93, at 1165 (noting that “parental empowerment is part of the very purpose of
[NCLB]” and that “[s]chool choice is the heart of this educational reform”).
153
For an explanation of how choice-fed competition could lead to better schools,
see CHUBB, supra note 31, at 206-15 (arguing that by giving parents choice among public schools while removing guaranteed financial support, schools will improve in response to competitive pressure).
154
Press Release, U.S. Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), Chairman, House Committee
on Education and the Workforce, Testing & Accountability: Empowering Parents at
Bureaucracy’s Expense (May 21, 2001), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/
press/press107/jaboped52201.htm.
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It was equally clear to Congress, however, that if states are not accountable to parents to produce the information as well as the academic and financial support to the parents that create choice, the reform model would not succeed. Representative Boehner further
evidenced congressional intent to make state educational systems accountable to parents by stating:
This week, the House of Representatives will vote on President George
W. Bush’s plan to inject real accountability into federal education spending. In doing so, we’ll have an opportunity to shift a meaningful degree
of authority back to parents and communities for the first time since
155
Washington got involved with education policy a generation ago.

Congress’s vision of improvement through state accountability
and parental action is reinforced by the Secretary of Education, who is
charged with implementing the Act. In an introduction to a Department of Education NCLB workbook for parents Secretary Rod Paige
says, “[n]o one cares more about your child’s future than you do, and
no one is better positioned to hold schools accountable for perform156
ance than you are.” The workbook also asserts that “assessments will
allow parents and officials to hold schools accountable for ensuring
157
that every child learns.”
For this model of institutional improvement to succeed, parents
must be empowered not only through information, but through the
ability to put pressure on the state if it fails to provide the financial
and academic support to students and schools promised in section
6311(b)(8). Without the ability to hold states to their promise to provide the information and resources that produce choice, parents are
powerless to create the change envisioned by Congress.
While there are provisions for central enforcement, that method
of enforcement is of limited utility. Centralized oversight of Title I
has been of limited effect in the past and is likely to be so in the fu158
The only penalty that the Department of Education can imture.
pose is a denial of funding, a remedy out of proportion to the nature

155

Id.
Rod Paige, Letter From the Secretary, in BACK TO SCHOOL, MOVING FORWARD:
WHAT “NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND” MEANS FOR AMERICA’S FAMILIES 5, 5 available at
http://www.ed.gov/inits/backtoschool/families/families.pdf.
157
Id. at 6-7.
158
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 27, at 9-13 (finding most states
out of compliance with the 1994 accountability and assessment requirements of Title
I); see also Zamora, supra note 11, at 431-32 (describing the historic and continued lack
of departmental enforcement of Title I).
156
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of most infractions, as well as counterproductive to the goal of creating additional resources or options in a district or at a school. Accord159
It is clear that Congress and the
ingly, this remedy is rarely used.
Department of Education envisioned that parents, as well as Department officials, would hold schools and the state educational agencies
accountable for the promises they have made. A private right of parental enforcement, therefore, is necessary for achieving the goal of
the Act, an opportunity for an effective education for all children.
E. An Exclusive Enforcement Scheme?
While the scope of the statutory enforcement scheme must be an
element considered in determining whether a private right exists, it
must be considered once again when a right is found. As Justice
O’Connor explained in Blessing v. Freestone:
[E]ven if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional
intent, dismissal is proper if Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy
under § 1983. Congress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to §
1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement un160
der § 1983.

When there is no direct prohibition of section 1983 actions, a state has
to “make the difficult showing that allowing § 1983 actions to go forward in these circumstances would be inconsistent with Congress’
161
carefully tailored scheme.” In Blessing, the Court acknowledged that
162
it has only twice found a scheme to be this comprehensive.
There is no persuasive argument that the enforcement scheme in
NCLB is comprehensive. In Gonzaga, the Court found that the centralized enforcement scheme of the Family Educational Rights and
159

Cf. Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1858-59 (discussing the problems of
exclusive central enforcement).
160
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
162
Id. at 347 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (finding that the “unusually elaborate enforcement provisions” of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, including several provisions authorizing private suits, precluded enforcement under section 1983); and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-12 (1984) (concluding that the “carefully tailored” local
administrative procedures created by the Education of the Handicapped Act precluded enforcement under section 1983)).
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Privacy Act created evidence against finding a right in the first in163
stance. Since the Court found no right, there was no consideration
of whether, on its own, the scheme was so comprehensive as to preclude section 1983 actions. FERPA, however, specifically stated that
“[e]xcept for the conduct of hearings, none of the functions of the
Secretary under this section shall be carried out in any of the regional
164
offices.” This provision was added in reaction to fear “that regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead to multiple interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, students, and in165
Accordingly, that enforcement scheme included an
stitutions.”
administrative system specifically designed to provide individualized
166
NCLB contains no provisions restrictadministrative enforcement.
ing decentralized enforcement nor does it create any individualized
administrative processes. Moreover, in the only two cases where the
Court found enforcement schemes so comprehensive as to preclude
private enforcement, the statutes in question included substantial administrative adjudicatory procedures to process and deal with individ167
ual complaints.
Not only has the Court never found an enforcement comprehensive that lacks any kind of individual process, it has also been hesitant
to allow statutes to remain without this characteristic. In Blessing, the
Court found it significant that
[t]he enforcement scheme that Congress created in Title IV-D is far
more limited than those in Sea Clammers and Smith. Unlike the federal
programs at issue in those cases, Title IV-D contains no private remedy—
either judicial or administrative—through which aggrieved persons can
seek redress. The only way that Title IV-D assures that States live up to
168
their child support plans is through the Secretary’s oversight.

In addition, “no private actor would have standing to force the Secretary to bring suit for specific performance. To the extent that Title IVD may give rise to individual rights, therefore, we agree . . . the Secretary’s oversight powers are not comprehensive enough to close the

163

Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g) (2000).
165
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 39,863 (1974)).
166
The Secretary created the Family Policy Compliance Office “to act as the Review Board required under the Act and to enforce the Act with respect to all applicable
programs.” Id. at 289.
167
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347.
168
Id. at 348.
164
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169

door on § 1983 liability.”
The Court was uncomfortable finding a
170
right with no private remedy at all. For NCLB to be the first statute
granting critically important rights, but no corresponding remedy,
would be an unfortunate irony given that the effectiveness of the Act
relies principally on individual participation and action.
NCLB is clearly intended to benefit children by providing a right
to “a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State
171
academic achievement standards and [S]tate academic assessments.”
This right is not too imprecise to enforce, because the specific steps a
state must take are enunciated clearly in provisions such as section
6311(b)(8). It is also clear that the federal government intended
these obligations to be binding. Not only do the language and structure of the Act make that clear, but state failure to live up to Title I obligations was the very impetus for restructuring the law to create
greater accountability and add more specific assessment provisions to
172
In addition, the improvement mechanism at
section 6311(b)(8).
169

Id. Similarly, it is unlikely that individuals would have standing to sue the Secretary to force compliance. The appropriate action would be to force the Secretary to
cut off funding to the State, which is not the compliance remedy parents would seek.
See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (finding that to have
standing, the plaintiff must show “an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision”).
170
Where the statute provides no private remedy and there is no enforcement of
rights by a supervisory federal agency, the parties may bring actions against the agency
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). The D.C. Circuit has
found, however, that where private action is allowed, APA enforcement is precluded.
See Council of & for the Blind v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1531-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that section 124 of the Revenue Sharing Act provides parties with an adequate
remedy and precludes enforcement under the APA). The D.C. Circuit has also found
congressional preference for individual actions against the offending party, rather
than suits demanding federal enforcement. See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v.
Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that “[t]he Cannon [v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)] opinion contrasts two private remedies: suit against a
discriminatory fund recipient to terminate the offending discrimination; and suit
against the government to terminate federal funding. The Court found strong support
in legislative history for the former, but resistance on the part of lawmakers toward the
latter”). Then-Judge Ginsburg, author of the opinion, noted “the Cannon Court observed that an APA suit to compel investigation and fund termination, although available if no private remedy exists, is far more disruptive of HEW’s efforts efficiently to
allocate its enforcement resources . . . than a private suit against the recipient of federal aid.” Id. at 751 (internal citations omitted). By finding that Congress intended a
centralized enforcement scheme, and ruling out any form of private administrative or
judicial remedy against the specific offender, a court would leave a far less favored
form of remedy as the only remaining option.
171
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001).
172
See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 154 (blaming Washington’s reluctance to
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work in the Act requires parental action to force school and district
competition. If states were able to prevent parental enforcement actions without repercussion, the entire market mechanism for improvement would fail. Departmental sanctions do not further this
kind of choice-based scheme. For these reasons, a court should find
that NCLB creates federally enforceable rights under section
6311(b)(8).
IV. REASONS FOR OPEN-MINDED SECTION 1983
JURISPRUDENCE
Since the success of the statutory scheme requires private rights,
and Congress clearly intended to create them, there is ample precedent for a court to find enforceable rights under NCLB even given the
reluctance toward rights creation evinced in Gonzaga. There is a possibility, however, that language in Gonzaga expressing a general disinclination to imply rights might drown out the decision’s precise lan173
guage suggesting situations when courts can and should find rights.
Again, the rights-creating language as well as the purpose and statutory scheme clearly point to an intent to create a private right of action in NCLB. Failing to find such a right within NCLB would reinforce an over-reading of Gonzaga and push rights enforcement law in
an unfortunate direction, undermining congressional intent and
174
other values at work in whatever statute is at hand. To avoid that result, Gonzaga should be interpreted by courts as a reaffirmation of the
Blessing test for creating rights and the Thiboutot presumption for their
enforcement under section 1983. In addition, there are both consti-

hold states accountable for a lack of improvement in education, despite increased Title
I spending).
173
It was this tendency that the Third Circuit addressed and corrected in overruling a district court failure to find a private right of action in three provisions of the
Medicaid Act, stating that
The District Court, relying heavily on Gonzaga University, concluded that
Congress had not unambiguously conferred the rights that plaintiffs sought to
vindicate under § 1983, and dismissed the suit. At first blush, language in
Gonzaga University would appear to support that conclusion. . . .
The Court, no doubt, has set a high bar for plaintiffs. Nonetheless, after
having considered the relevant provisions of the Medicaid Act against the
backdrop of Gonzaga University, we are convinced that Congress unambiguously conferred the rights which plaintiffs here seek to enforce. Accordingly,
we will reverse the order of the District Court.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
174
Cf. Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1872 n.219, 1873-74 & n.230 (citing
cases where courts have misconstrued Gonzaga).
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tutional and normative reasons why the courts should keep an open
mind toward section 1983 suits seeking to enforce state obligations accepted under federal grant-in-aid statutes.
A. Respect for Congressional Intent
A narrow reading of Gonzaga, conflating the implied remedy and
the implied rights doctrines, would undermine congressional intent
by rendering “[s]ection 1983 meaningless as an independent source
175
The Supreme Court risks substantially undercutting
of authority.”
Congress’s lawmaking power by imposing the same restrictive test on
section 1983 plaintiffs as is used when implying a remedy under the
176
statute itself. First, the Court will have ignored congressional intent
not only in creating an independent remedy for enforcing statutory
rights but in reaffirming the meaning of the “and laws” language in
section 1983. When, in Thiboutot, the Court first assumed that Con177
gress intended all rights-creating statutes to be so enforced, Congress refused to adopt amendments to limit section 1983 to civil rights
178
statutes. If the same test were applied in section 1983 and implied
remedies cases, section 1983 would become redundant because petitioners would have rights directly under the statute in question and
would never need to resort to the section 1983 remedy. Second, allu-

175

Id. at 1882 (internal citations omitted).
See Key, supra note 15, at 286 (arguing that the Court’s restrictions violate the
requirement of separation of powers). The issue was also addressed in Pamela S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 183 (2003), in which Karlan argued:
There is an important class of cases in which the legislature and the executive
must depend on the judiciary for the efficacy of their judgments. In these
cases, it is judicial refusals to act that pose a danger “to the political rights of
the Constitution.”
Marbury itself recognized this threat, when Chief Justice Marshall observed
that the government of the United States could no longer be “termed a government of laws, and not of men . . . if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”
Id. at 184 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
177
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1980).
178
Lisa E. Key described this refusal to limit the scope of section 1983:
In 1981, 1985, and again in 1987, Senator Hatch proposed an amendment to
§ 1983 that would explicitly limit the term “laws” to civil rights laws. The proposed amendment did not pass on any of these occasions. Although this is
not evidence of the original intent of the drafters of § 1983, it is evidence of
the intent of more recent Congresses to not limit the scope of § 1983 statutory
actions to cases arising under civil rights laws.
Key, supra note 15, at 313 (footnote omitted).
176
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sions in Gonzaga to the Cort v. Ash test, whose fourth prong evinces
federalism concerns, suggests that the Court is engaging in political
179
judgments as to the wisdom of federalizing traditional state tasks. In
180
Rosado v. Wyman, Justice Harlan stated the appropriate role of the
Court in interpreting federal funding statutes: “It is, of course, no
part of the business of this Court to evaluate, apart from federal constitutional or statutory challenge, the merits or wisdom of any welfare
181
programs, whether state or federal, in the large or in the particular.”
By imposing judgments as to the appropriateness, rather than legality,
of federal policy, the Court impinges on legislative authority and disrespects the separation of powers boundaries discussed by Justice
Harlan.
Since there are no constitutional principles mandating a narrow
interpretation of rights in spending statutes as in implied remedies
cases, the Court has not overturned its Thiboutot and Blessing precedents indicating a separate and more flexible approach to implied
rights cases. As the Court impinges on Congress’s power and express
intent to preserve an independent remedy against state officials for
violations of federal statutory rights, it should retain a broader approach to evaluating congressional intent to allocate individual rights.
This objective can be realized by maintaining the Blessing test and by
allowing Congress to articulate its “unambiguous” intent to benefit a
certain class through a wider variety of means than the specific language demanded by Sandoval in implied remedies cases.
B. Undermines Principles of Responsive Government and
Individual Participation
Since section 1983 is express evidence of congressional intent to
create a remedy, Congress cannot rely on separation of powers
grounds to adopt the Sandoval presumption against enforceability or
the narrow intent-based test that implements it. The Court’s invoca182
tion in Gonzaga of cases that employ the Cort v. Ash test, whose

179

Whether or not this political judgment is appropriate in light of both the separation of powers concerns specific to implied right of action cases and in light of Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), relegating federalism
concerns to the political process is beyond the scope of this Comment.
180
397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970).
181
Id. at 422-23.
182
536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979), Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), and California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), all of which employed the Cort v. Ash test to explain the
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fourth prong demands respect for areas of traditional state concern,
suggests that the Court’s desire to protect the states from unreasonable federal demands motivates their more sparing reading of federal
183
A number of members of the current Court have strongly
rights.
184
The only overt statement exendorsed this view in their opinions.
pressing federalism concerns in the section 1983 context came in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Wilder dissent. There he took umbrage at
“the Court’s suggestion that the States would deliberately disregard
the requirements of the statute” which “does less than justice to the
185
States.”
Federalism as a principle of political organization is meant to protect and promote individual liberty by protecting the autonomy of
state government against the accumulation of centralized power and
thereby providing increased control over one’s personal environ186
187
However, as Wechsler argued, and the Supreme Court
ment.
188
ruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, state participation and influence in the federal legislative process “ensures that
189
laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated,” and
that “State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
190
by judicially created limitations on federal power.”
relevance of implied cause of action analysis to implied rights doctrine).
183
See Key, supra note 15, at 350 (arguing that similar restrictions in Suter reflect
federalism concerns of the politically conservative justices).
184
See id. at 347 n.353 (providing a demonstrative summary of Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s federalist ideology as well as some of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas’s federalist decisions).
185
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498, 528 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186
See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest Á. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134-43 (2001) (discussing how federalism allows local
communities to make their own political decisions).
187
Herbert Wechsler has argued that federalism protects states, not individuals,
and therefore:
The judicial function in relation to federalism thus differs markedly from that
performed in the application of those constitutional restraints on Congress or
the states that are designed to safeguard individuals. In this latter area of the
constitutional protection of the individual against government, both federal
and state, subordination of the Court to Congress would defeat the purpose of
judicial mediation. For this is where the political processes cannot be relied
upon to introduce their own correctives . . . .
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 560 n.59 (1954).
188
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
189
Id. at 556.
190
Id. at 552.
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The Court found in Gregory v. Ashcroft, however, that when “[t]he
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government” is altered, Congress “must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” for an
191
Act to be enforced against the states. Yet in Gregory, the Court was
clear that the presumption against enforcement was justified because
192
the ADEA provision at issue in that case, limiting Missouri’s ability to
prescribe age limits for their state judges, went beyond regulating “an
area traditionally regulated by the States” to affect decisions “of the
193
most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.” Interpreting Gonzaga
as imposing a similar presumption against enforceability does not respect the distinction drawn in the Court’s federalism decisions in general, and Garcia and Gregory in particular, between infringing on the
194
policy versus the structural decisions of state governments, and is in
195
Implied rights enforceable undirect contradiction with Thiboutot.
der section 1983 do not create the kind of structural threat that warrants judicial protection of state interests. Therefore, a presumption
against enforcement cannot rest on protection of state autonomy.
In addition to the deontological value of federalism, at least four
members of the Court have cited its practical benefits in decisions resisting federal authority over the states. Justice O’Connor’s descriptions of these purposes in many of her decisions are aptly summarized
196
by Professors Rubin and Feeley:
Federalism, Justice O’Connor states “increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes,” it “makes government more re-

191

501 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
193
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (internal citations omitted).
194
In addition, where there is no Eleventh Amendment issue, as there is not in the
case of NCLB, the Supreme Court has not found judicial enforcement of statutes in
general to be as invasive of state autonomy as enforcement by federal administrative
agents. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (placing administrative
and legislative enforcement on a different footing from court enforcement of federal
regulatory programs, with the former being more intrusive).
195
See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 904 (1994) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s decision in
Gregory was dictated by “principles of federalism [that] created a presumption against
the Act’s coverage of the state’s ‘important government officials’—a presumption that
could be overcome only by clear, unambiguous language”).
196
Id. at 906 (stating that members of the Court confuse normative principles of
federalism with managerial principles of decentralization—if the benefits attributed to
federalism exist, they result from the latter).
192
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sponsive by putting States in competition for a mobile citizenry,” and “it
197
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government.”

Not only are restrictions on Spending Clause legislation to further
values the Court finds more important a possible violation of the separation of powers principle laid out in Garcia, but a restrictive view of
implied rights of action also does not further the values articulated by
Justice O’Connor.
1. Experimentation
Many Spending Clause statutes do not curtail the state’s ability to
engage in policy experimentation. As in NCLB, the federal government often enunciates a broad objective and invites each state to develop its own methods and policies for attaining the goal. While the
issue of whether NCLB grants enough state autonomy has certainly
198
been a matter of debate, these policy questions are political, not judicial, since the federal government is allowed to condition funds on
199
compliance with specific requirements.
2. Responsive Government
The assumption that governments at the state level will be more
responsive to all citizens because they will want to develop policies
that attract resident taxpayers is fundamentally flawed in at least one
respect. Poor residents may not be taxpayers and may require more
200
resources from the state than wealthier citizens. Under this market
197

Id. at 907 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).
See, e.g., Jo Becker & Rosalind S. Helderman, Va. Seeks to Leave Bush Law Behind:
Republicans Fight School Mandates, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2004, at A01 (reporting the frustration of Republican Virginia state legislators at having to rework their accountability
system to meet No Child Left Behind requirements).
199
No Child Left Behind is attracting a substantial degree of political attention
and was at the center of the 2004 presidential campaign. A search of the Lexis-Nexis
database for all news sources over the past ninety days performed on January 24, 2004,
found 233 articles with “No Child Left Behind” in the title and more than 3000 mentioning the Act in their text. For examples of the centrality of the issue to the presidential campaign, see Janet Hook, No Politics Left Behind in Education Debate, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2004, at A1 (“The education improvement law has become a hot political issue . . . .”); Erik W. Robelen, “No Child” Law Faulted in Democratic Race, EDUC. WEEK,
Jan. 14, 2004, at 1 (“The No Child Left Behind Act took center stage for a prolonged
discussion when Democratic presidential candidates gathered in Iowa last week for
their ninth debate.”).
200
See James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 1316 (1971) (arguing that city policies favor the upper-middle class in order to retain taxpaying citizens and are a rational fiscal strategy for cities).
198
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201

theory of government, the state is not likely to develop policies that
address the needs of poor or even lower-middle class citizens and, in
fact, may develop policies to their detriment in an effort to repel
202
Not only are policy decisions
rather than attract such residents.
made to attract wealthy tax-paying residents, but politicians are politically more responsive to wealthy constituents who can contribute
203
While unequal influence
more resources toward their reelection.
or access is not unconstitutional, there are potentially adverse social
and economic ramifications resulting from these inequalities. Policies
conceived to attract wealthy residents may benefit the state and local
budgets as well as state and local politicians in the short-run, but create long-term local, regional, and national problems that many grant204
Title I of NCLB is a clear example of this
in-aid statutes address.
type of legislation. It was created to remedy the economic and social
ramifications of states’ inability to provide an adequate education for
205
poor students.
Assuming that one goal of federalism is to make government responsive to the people, private rights enforcement can serve an important role in allowing individuals without political or economic
206
power to demand state government action on their own. This kind
of responsiveness, as well as being necessary to facilitate the social
ideal of equity, is economically necessary where traditional political
201

See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418-420 (1956) (articulating the theory that citizens are consumers, communities are
like goods, and community leaders have an inherent incentive to develop an attractive
set of services).
202
See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-157 (1978)
(describing two models of local government legitimacy). See generally ROSCOE C.
MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1965) (observing that state governments have failed to address urban problems).
203
See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 195, at 915 (noting that local political participation tends to be the province of the wealthy and powerful and works to exclude or disadvantage less fortunate citizens).
204
See Alan N. Greenspan, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A
Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1047-48 (1988) (asserting that
federal intervention is necessary when competition among states forces them to neglect the “welfare, safety, or morality” of their citizens); Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan RoseAckerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN
ASSESSMENT 111, 117-18 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984) (suggesting that
competition among states discourages social welfare programs).
205
See supra Part I.
206
Non-profit legal organizations dedicated to rectifying social problems such as
inadequate education bring suits on behalf of people who are too poor to afford an
attorney.
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incentives are not effective. To weaken Congress’s ability to remedy
this failure is to undermine rather than strengthen the ideal of governmental responsiveness.
3. Participation
Participation is the aspect of federalism most jeopardized by overreading a presumption against enforceability of federal rights into
Gonzaga. Granting citizens effective political participation through
private rights of action where traditional political mechanisms have
failed has local social and economic ramifications that go beyond the
adoption of effective policy. When Alexis de Tocqueville sought to
explain the value of local democracy in America, he did not speak in
terms of efficiency. In fact, he believed that local democratic govern207
But by
ment was far more inefficient than centralized monarchy.
allowing individuals an opportunity to shape the policies of their
community according to their self-interest, empowered individuals
take that spirit of innovation and carry it into their social and economic life:
Aristocracy thinks more about preservation than improvement.
On the contrary, when public authority is in the hands of the people,
they, as the sovereign power, seek out improvements in every quarter because of their own discontent.
The spirit of improvement then infiltrates a thousand different areas;
it delves into endless detail and above all advocates those sorts of improvements which cannot be achieved without payment; for its concern
is to better the condition of the poor who cannot help themselves.
Furthermore, an aimless restlessness permeates democratic societies
where a kind of everlasting excitement stimulates all sorts of innovations
208
which almost always involve expense.

De Tocqueville saw a direct connection between individualized political power, notably for the poor, and the spirit of involvement and in207

According to de Tocqueville:
Government by one man alone is more consistent in his rule than a crowd
would be, supposing equal enlightenment in both both these parties. He displays more persistence, more overall vision, more attention to detail, a better
judgment of men. Anyone who refutes these things has either never seen a
democratic republic at work or bases his assessment on very few examples.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 285
208
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 246.
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novation that has distinguished this country and been central to its
achievements.
Commentators equate this vision of local democracy and individual political participation with debate in town hall meetings, political
209
This
rallies, and meetings with local or state representatives.
method of placing pressure on representatives is appealing in a way
that does not hold true for going to the local federal courthouse to
demand state action. There is no difference, however, in the motivation of the individual or in the result for the individual or the community. Where effective political action is denied because of wealth,
individual rights enforcement provides the same type of political participation with the same benefits for the individual and the community as a whole.
The school improvement scheme in NCLB is an instance where
Congress has sought to create alternative forms of power for the poor
to attain congressional reform goals. NCLB seeks to improve failing
public schools by instituting competition through accountability and
choice. Schools in affluent areas succeed because parents in these
communities have the resources to create competition through the
option of private school and have the political clout to assure higher
levels of funding and attention to problems should the school system
210
The belief in a “Town Hall” solution is flawed befail to respond.

209

Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 195, at 906 (noting the feelings of nostalgia and
idealism that accompany federalism, stating that it “conjures up images of Fourth of
July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms with tire
swings in the front yard”).
210
See Taylor, supra note 115, at 1752-53 (discussing the factors that make schools
in wealthy districts more successful than those in poorer districts). In addition, nearly
every state has been through at least one round of litigation challenging the constitutionality of state funding formulas under state constitutions. The latest successes include Arkansas and New York. For a comprehensive listing of the relevant cases, see
Kelly Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an
Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 402 n.22 (2000). The Supreme Court has
found that there is no right to an adequate education under the federal Constitution.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that
education is not explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution); see also, Rubin &
Feeley, supra note 195, at 919 (noting both the ironic and erroneous use of the rhetoric of local autonomy to defend state policies that undermine local interests); Joan C.
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City
Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 104-113, 118-119 (making the same observation specifically about the Court’s decisions against equitable funding in San Antonio and desegregation orders in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)); cf. WILLIAM
A. FIRESTONE ET AL., FROM CASHBOX TO CLASSROOM: THE STRUGGLE FOR FISCAL
REFORM AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN NEW JERSEY 44-49 (1997) (describing the impact of community wealth on the quality of school districts in New Jersey); id. at 40
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cause even if poor parents are informed (which they would have to be
to take judicial action under NCLB), they do not have the resources
or political influence to create options or force governmental atten211
tion. Even if their motivation is self-interest, allowing parents access
to courts to enforce standards that have been set by the localities and
states themselves is a way of encouraging citizens to be involved in the
future and success of their community by redressing imbalances in po212
litical power.
Where Congress has constitutionally decided that a national policy is necessary, the democratic goal of local participation is well
served through private statutory enforcement. Private action allows
each locality to voice the extent to which policies should be enforced
and forces citizens to become engaged in policy. If a majority of citizens are unhappy, if the state feels too much financial pressure, or if
Congress finds decentralized enforcement too disruptive, each has political and legislative tools at their disposal to correct the situation.
By allowing citizens the authority to hold governments accountable, private rights of action encourage an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit. Professor Karlan, criticizing the Court’s growing reluctance to grant private rights of action and the resulting rightsremedies gap, stated:
Presumably, that [gap] will increase the number of uncorrected violations, leaving the right less completely protected. Just as “[t]o the extent
that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen,” so
too, to the extent that the ability to enforce a right is debased, it is that
213
much less a right.

Not only does the inability to vindicate rights undermine the value of
the right, it undermines the value of the citizen who is left without judicial or political recourse. This situation does damage not just to our
self-conception as a country that places a premium on equality, but
also to our reliance on each individual’s belief in access and opportunity to fuel a productive and innovative society.
For defenders of federalism, the value of state and local government does not lie solely in the institutions themselves, but in their

(highlighting the disparity between low and high wealth districts in New Jersey).
211
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 279 (“If . . . you fail to link the idea of
rights to individual self-interest, which is the only fixed point in the human heart, what
else have you got to rule the world except fear?”).
212
See supra text accompanying note 206.
213
Karlan, supra note 176, at 195 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567
(1964)).
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ability to safeguard liberty and produce desirable results such as innovation, participation, and responsiveness. Where governments fail to
produce these benefits through traditional political methods, other
means are necessary. When evaluating a statute, courts should keep
in mind the benefits private enforcement can bring not only to an individual, but to the spirit of a community. And when evaluating congressional intent, it should be remembered that federal statutes often
address national needs created by an imbalance of political power that
makes private enforcement necessary. Statutes must be interpreted in
light of larger principles, but the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that the appropriate balance of power between federal and state governments in shaping public policy is one principle that is left to politi214
cal, not judicial, judgment.
C. A Damaging Presumption Against Effectiveness
In his Wilder dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized what he felt
was the majority’s unfair assumption that states would not voluntarily
215
live up to the obligations agreed to in exchange for federal funds.
The Court’s “assumption” in Wilder, however, is supported in that case
by evidence of congressional unhappiness with state compliance and
evidence of states’ failure to comply. On the other hand, to interpret
Gonzaga narrowly would have the Court engage in its own “unfair assumption” that Congress has no interest in accomplishing the purposes laid out in its legislation. Should the Court render section 1983
meaningless and reverse the Thiboutot presumption in favor of rights
enforcement, the switch would reflect an assumption that if Congress
actually wanted to accomplish its goals, lawmakers would say so “un216
ambiguously.”
Legislative language is often ambiguous due to the necessities of
compromise. Moreover, ambiguity may be a purposeful tactic neces217
sary to get majority support. Ambiguity of this sort does not change
214

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (“The
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”).
215
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 528 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1858-63 (discussing whether Spending Clause statutes are meant to be underenforced and concluding that Congress has
become increasingly sophisticated in articulating when it means for statutes to be underenforced).
217
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV., 627, 640-42
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the fact that Congress has unambiguously passed legislation addressing a problem, and the successful passage of the legislation demonstrates that it is a problem with national resonance. State acceptance
of federal money unambiguously expresses its recognition of the
problem, and acknowledges that the state has not resolved the issue
218
The purpose of grant-in-aid legislation is not to give
on its own.
money for a promise, but to give money for results. The evolution of
Title I reflects the developing awareness that a promise is not sufficient.
Congressional revision of perennially ignored mandates such as
Title I demonstrates an intent to demand compliance. Federal agency
enforcement has repeatedly proven insufficient for realizing this in219
tent, and as a result many modern grant-in-aid statutes rely heavily
on private enforcement. As Professor Karlan has observed, “[t]he
idea behind the ‘private attorney general’ can be stated relatively simply: Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by empow220
ering private individuals to bring suit.”

(2002) (outlining the legislative incentives for ambiguous language, including the
need to compromise in order to accumulate enough votes for enactment).
218
This is the notion of cooperative federalism, a system which has long been employed by Congress:
In 1887, Congress enacted the first program pursuant to which cash grants
were available to the states from the federal government on an annual basis.
It was not until 1932, however, in the midst of the Great Depression, that federal grant-in-aid programs began to play a significant role in the relationship
between the federal government and the states. . . . These programs, which
included the Social Security Act of 1935 and the National Housing Act of
1934, were seen as a way to blend the powers of the state and federal governments—a concept known as cooperative federalism—to provide greater benefits for all.
Key, supra note 15 at 287-88.
219
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1858-63 (describing the limited nature of agency enforcement of Spending Clause laws).
220
Karlan, supra note 176, at 186. The Supreme Court further expressed the value
of private enforcement in the voting rights case Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969):
The achievement of the [Voting Rights] Act’s laudable goal could be severely
hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General. . . . The Attorney
General has a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new
regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels of state government.
It is consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county government complies with the
[Act].
Id. at 556-57.
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Congress has taken action to demonstrate that it intends to attain
221
its policy goals through private enforcement, and that the Supreme
Court’s prior denials of a private right of action violated this intent.
Most importantly, Congress amended the Social Security Act after the
Court found no unenforceable rights in Suter, demonstrating that the
222
Court’s narrow interpretation misconstrued congressional intent.
The amendment was also construed by many lower courts not only as
a repudiation of the Court’s interpretation of the statute, but of the
223
Court’s restrictive reasoning.
Aside from the apparent incorrectness of a presumption against
enforceability, there is a danger that the presumption would damage
the authority of Congress and ultimately the Court. Scholars recognize that the impartial enforcement of laws is as important for garnering obedience as their substantive content, and is critical to a govern224
ment’s maintenance of practical authority. It is common knowledge
in teaching that to retain authority over a classroom, it is not enough
for a teacher to have fair rules—those rules must also be fairly and
225
consistently enforced. To do so is a matter of maintaining respect,
but more importantly, it is a matter of maintaining control. Similarly,
the history of Title I demonstrates that, where Congress has not provided for effective enforcement mechanisms, states have not respected
the authority of Congress. This situation damages the realization of
national interests and the political culture of the country.

221

See supra note 116.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2000).
223
See Stanberry v. Sherman, 75 F.3d. 581, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (turning back
the clock to pre-Suter reasoning and looking only to whether the federal statutory provisions were sufficiently definite to create enforceable rights and not evince an intent
to preclude enforcement under § 1983); Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268,
1283 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (finding that the “amendment overrules the general theory in
Suter that the only private right of action available under a statute requiring a state plan
is an action against the state for not having that plan”).
224
Scholars have found that people obey laws when they believe that the lawmaker
is legitimate. E.g., Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities Into Account When
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 716 (2000). This sense of legitimacy stems from fairness. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 137-38 (1990)
(describing the subjective value of procedural fairness); HARRY K. WONG & ROSEMARY
T. WONG, HOW TO BE AN EFFECTIVE TEACHER: THE FIRST DAYS OF SCHOOL 151 (2nd
ed. 1998) (explaining the necessity of fair classroom rules); Raymond Paternoster et
al., Do Fair Procedures Matter?: The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 163, 167-68 (1997) (summarizing the aspects of procedural justice that lead
to fairness and compliance).
225
WONG & WONG, supra note 224.
222
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It can be argued that if these decisions violate the political will of
their constituents, there will be political repercussions. But flaws in
political representation and a failure to address issues of national significance created the necessity of national legislation in the first
226
place. By making it more difficult to find and enforce rights in federal statutes, the Court makes that political decision not by limiting
Congressional power in a way that respects the construct of the Constitution, but by making it ineffective in a way that undermines the
227
authority and potential of the nation.
CONCLUSION
It would be a mistake for lower courts now, and the Supreme
Court ultimately, to construe Gonzaga as importing the current stringent Sandoval analysis into section 1983 doctrine. Such an interpretation, by reversing the presumption in favor of enforceability created in
Thiboutot and restricting section 1983 analysis to the search for the
specific rights-creating language contained in Titles VI and IX, would
228
render section 1983 meaningless. Instead, the Court should adhere
to the Blessing test to determine the clarity with which obligations are
229
imposed on the state. Courts should be willing to accept a wide variety of statutory formulations as indicative of “unambiguous” intent
to create rights. As stated by Justice Breyer in his Gonzaga concurrence, “the statute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their
purposes too complex . . . . [to] predetermine an outcome through
the use of a presumption—such as the majority’s presumption that a
right is conferred only if set forth ‘unambiguously’ in the statute’s
230
While the text and structure of NCLB meet
‘text and structure.’”
this rigorous standard, the costs of such a stringent test far outweigh
any of the potential benefits suggested by the Court’s opinions.
226

See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 935 (1999)(arguing that the motivation behind restricting remedies rather
than rights is that the curtailment of remedies is much less visible to the public and
remedies are assumed to evolve over time, therefore changes to remedies do not have
the same impact on the Court’s legitimacy).
228
Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1883-85.
229
“[T]he test we have ‘traditionally’ used, as articulated in Blessing: whether
Congress intended to benefit individual plaintiffs, whether the right asserted is not
‘vague and amorphous,’ and whether Congress has placed a binding obligation on the
State with respect to the right asserted.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41).
230
Id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring).
227
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Courts asking whether a statute conveys a benefit on individuals
should be willing to look at the overall purpose of the act, the creation
of accountability to individuals, or clear statements aspiring to universal attainment of statutory goals, not only to confirm a judgment
based on statutory text but as unambiguous statements in themselves.
Merging the second and third prong of Cort v. Ash, requiring consideration of the context and purpose of the act as further indicators of
intent, allows for courts to honor the Court’s invocation of implied
right of action analysis while still honoring congressional intent in
creating section 1983 and in defining national goals in the statute at
hand. Under the second and third prongs of Blessing, state plan requirements that ask for descriptions of state action to meet statutory
goals should be read as binding obligations and not procedural rights.
This reading would reflect an appropriate presumption in favor of,
rather than against, congressional effectiveness. Where Congress has
indicated through its enforcement provisions that it does not intend
full enforcement, or that individual enforcement would inhibit a
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the Court can find against a private right of action under the second part of the Wright test.
This Comment is not an endorsement of any of the policy decisions made in NCLB. Instead, it uses NCLB to demonstrate how the
Court’s increasingly sparing willingness to find a right could lead it to
undermine congressional intent and frustrate the principles of responsive government and participation that several members of the
Court have asserted are central to their judicial decision-making. As
stated by de Tocqueville, the benefits of democracy are not in the institutions themselves but in the society they create:
Democracy . . . ensures what the most skillful administration is often too
powerless to create, namely to spread through the whole social community a restless activity, an overabundant force, an energy which never exists without it and which, however unfavorable the circumstances, can
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perform wonders. Therein lies its real advantages.

We weaken these advantages when we undermine the creativity of
Congress to address national problems, improve political participation, promote governmental responsiveness, and even to encourage
that most stable patriotism that begins with education and grows
through the enforcement of rights.
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DE TOCQUEVILLE,

supra note 1, at 285-86.

